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WHEN HONESTY IS "SIMPLY ...
IMPRACTICAL" FOR THE SUPREME
COURT: HOW THE CONSTITUTION
CAME TO REQUIRE BUSING FOR
SCHOOL RACIAL BALANCE
Lino A. Graglia*

SWANN'S WAY: THE SCHOOL BUSING CASE AND THE SUPREME
COURT. By Bernard Schwartz. New York: Oxford University Press.
1986. Pp. 245. $19.95.
Following in the footsteps of The Brethren, 1 Swann's Way purports to give a behind-the-scenes description of Supreme Court decisionmaking based on interviews with unidentified Supreme Court
Justices, law clerks, and published and unpublished documents.
While The Brethren covers a seven-year period, Swann 's Way considers a single decision, also discussed in The Brethren, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 2 the school busing case.
Although padded with material, such as a description of the Supreme
Court courtroom, of interest only to a general reader, 3 the book tells
the story of the writing of the Swann opinion in a detail - a separate
chapter is devoted to each but one of Chief Justice Burger's six drafts
- that could be of interest, if at all, only to a specialist.
Six drafts of the Swann opinion were required because of the extraordinary fact that Chief Justice Burger assigned the writing of the
opinion to himself despite the fact that he was in basic disagreement
with a majority of the Justices as to the decision to be reached. This,
however, was already well known, having previously been discussed in
The Brethren 4 and elsewhere, 5 and Swann's Way adds little to our
knowledge of the incident except that it publishes as an appendix the
full text of Burger's first draft. It seems, therefore, an example of a
history written less because of new insight into the events described
• Rex G. Baker and Edna Heflin Baker Professor of Constitutional Law, University of
Texas. B.A. 1952, City College of New York; LL.B. 1954, Columbia University. - Ed.
1. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
(1979).
2. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
3. See, e.g., pp. 43-45 ("How the Court Operates"), 94-95 (description of Court chamber).
4. B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note l, at 95-112.
5. Totenberg, Behind the Marble, Beneath the Robes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 15; L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME CoURT DECISIONS ON RACE
AND THE SCHOOLS 140-41 (1976).
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than simply because additional documents became available. It could
be considered an extension of Professor Schwartz' previous book, The
Unpublished Opinions of the Warren Court, 6 except that he here provides extensive commentary in the nature of cheerleading for what he
considers the forces of good.
Few decisions merit further study and discussion more than the
Supreme Court's decision in Swann. Legal historians will almost
surely one day see it as the Dred Scott 7 of the twentieth century, the
outstanding example of improper judicial behavior resulting in a decision of disastrous consequences. 8 No decision better illustrates both
the magnitude of the Court's policymaking power and the lack of
scruple - the essential irrelevance to the Court of logic and fact - in
the Court's exercise of that power. In Swann the Court created a
hardly credible constitutional requirement that public school children
be excluded from their neighborhood schools and transported to more
distant schools because of their race in an effort to make the schools
more racially integrated than the neighborhoods in which the children
live and, specifically, to disperse black students, to the extent possible,
among white students. Because many middle-class parents, mostly
white, typically refuse to permit their children to be subjected to the
requirement, its usual effect in urban areas, where most blacks live,
has been to increase, not decrease, racial separation, first in the public
schools and then in the cities. The result is that the public school
systems of all or nearly all of our major cities today are predominantly, and usually overwhelmingly, exclusive preserves for blacks,
Hispanics, and the poor.
Because it could not openly state and defend a constitutional requirement of school racial integration, the Court in Swann wrote an
opinion asserting, in direct contradiction of the facts of the case, that it
was merely continuing to enforce Brown v. Board of Education 's9 prohibition of legally compelled segregation. 10 The Court affirmed an order requiring the exclusion of children from their neighborhood
schools because of their race with no other justification than that all
such exclusion is constitutionally prohibited, something possible only
for a Court that is indeed supreme. None of this is of interest to, or
6. B. SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985).
7. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
8. See L. GRAGLIA, supra note 5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding unconstitu·
tional the majority of states' abortion-restricting laws, effectively creating a national regime of
abortion on demand, and making an enormously divisive national political issue out of what was
previously being satisfactorily handled on a state-by-state basis, is undoubtedly the strongest
competing contender for the title. Other contenders include Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 221-22 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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apparently even understood by, Professor Schwartz, however, who
merely wants to tell once more the inspiring story of the Court's triumph, despite the machinations of Chief Justice Burger, over the racist opponents of Brown. Because Schwartz fails to understand the
distinction between prohibiting segregation and requiring integration
and, especially, the importance to the Court of seeming to maintain
the distinction, Swann's Way fails even to inform the reader of what
the struggle that re8ulted in the six drafts the book is devoted to
describing was actually about.
The struggle over the Swann opinion was not, as Swann's Way
leads the reader to think, merely about whether the requirement being
imposed should be called "integration" or "desegregation" - no one
favored openly calling it "integration" - but over whether the requirement that would continue to be called "desegregation" should be
defined. The crux of the amazing story of the Swann opinion is that a
majority of the Justices, led by Justice Brennan, labored to keep the
meaning of "desegregation" and "unitary system" as obscure and confused as possible, so as better to conceal that the actual requirement
was not compliance with Brown's prohibition of racial discrimination
but, on the contrary, the practice of racial discrimination in order to
create racially mixed or "balanced" schools and, in particular, to eliminate majority black schools.
Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, sought to have the Court
actually define the supposed desegregation requirement - as the elimination of unconstitutional segregation, not the elimination of all racial
separation or "imbalance" whatever its cause - to make clear that it
was not the same as a simple requirement of integration and, therefore, at least in theory, very limited. Burger could not deny Brennan
the result he wanted, complete affi.rmance of the district judge's order
of district-wide busing for near-perfect racial balance, but he was able
to retain some of his language, despite the six drafts, insisting, despite
the actual order being affirmed, that the Court was merely continuing
to enforce Brown's prohibition of legally-compelled segregation. The
result is perhaps the most schizophrenic decision in history: The
meaning of Swann depends entirely on whether one looks to what the
Court actually did on the facts or - as Burger, acting on his own,
later explicitly urged 11 - at what the Court claimed to be doing.
11. Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Bd. of Educ. v. Scott, 404 U.S. 1221, 1227-31 (1971).
Sitting as Circuit Justice, Burger reprimanded a hapless district court judge for undertaking "an
independent, subjective analysis of how his case compared factually with the Swann case something he could not do adequately without an examination of a comprehensive record not
before him." 404 U.S. at 1225. As ifhe thought he had the power to undo alone what he was
forced to do as spokesman for the Court in Swann, Burger had a copy of this opinion mailed to
every lower federal court judge in the country, marked "For the personal attention of the Judge."
L. GRAGLIA, supra note 5, at 140.
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SEGREGATION, DESEGREGATION, INTEGRATION:
FROM BROWN TO GREEN

An understanding of Swann and the present state of the law of
school "desegregation" requires a brief review of prior developments.
In Brown the Court, of course, held school racial segregation unconstitutional, invalidating state laws that required the assignment of children to separate schools on the basis of race. Although Plessy v.
Ferguson, 12 permitting "equal but separate" public facilities for the
races, was not "flatly overruled," as Professor Schwartz states (p. 47)
(the Court took pains to distinguish Plessy, a railroad case, as "involving not education but transportation" 13), it soon became clear that
Brown was to be understood as prohibiting all racial discrimination by
government. 14
Because of the very real possibility that the Deep South would respond to Brown by simply abolishing free public education, leaving
blacks worse off than before, the Court refused to require compliance
in 1954. And in the following year, with the "all deliberate speed"
formula, the Court took the unprecedented and unprincipled step of,
in effect, making compliance optional for a decade. 15 Brown's antidiscrimination principle finally became effective and enforceable when it
was endorsed by Congress and the President in the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, 16 and legally required school segregation then quickly came to an
end. Brown, seemingly a daring gamble at the time, was seen as a
great triumph, and the moral superiority of policymaking by the
Supreme Court over policymaking by elected officials - even though
it was the 1964 Act that brought segregation to an end- was widely
accepted.
It soon appeared, however, that although school racial segregation
had come to an end in the South, school racial separation would not.
Despite the end of racial assignment, a high degree of separation
would obviously continue to exist in the South just as it had always
existed in the rest of the country. 17 Residential racial concentration,
although less in the South than elsewhere (ironically, in part because
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13. 347 U.S. at 491.
14. See, e.g., Mayor ofBaltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, ajfg. 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955)
(public beaches and bath houses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, vacating 223 F.2d 93
(5th Cir. 1955) (municipal golf courses); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, ajfg. 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956) (buses).
15. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); see also Shuttlesworth v. Birming·
ham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101, ajfg. 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958) (upholding, four years
after Brown, an Alabama "pupil placement" law that effectively guaranteed that no integration
would take place).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000c (1982).
17. See Bickel, The Decade ofSchool Desegregation - Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 193 (1964).
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of school segregation, which meant the races could live together without going to school together), meant that the nonracial assignment of
children to schools according to neighborhood would result in many
schools all or largely of one race. In the euphoria of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, when all things seemed possible through federal law, this
result proved deeply disappointing to those who had fought so long
and hard to establish and effectuate the Brown antidiscrimination
principle.
Although no one was any longer being barred from any school or, indeed, from any public facility or even, under the 1964 Act, any
privately owned place of public accommodation - because of race,
the cry went up that "nothing had happened." The civil rights establishment that had grown up and prospered with the acceptance of
Brown was in need of new worlds to conquer, and the federal courts,
now long-accustomed to directing the operation of school systems,
were more than ready to provide further "moral leadership." If ending compulsory segregation did not produce the millenium of total racial integration, it was obviously time to move on to compulsory
integration, even though this would mean abandoning the very principle of no racial discrimination by government that had made opposition to segregation irresistible.
There was no way, however, that a legal requirement of integration
could be obtained through the processes of representative government.
Congress, having just acted to eliminate official racial discrimination,
could hardly be persuaded to reinstate it in order to compel racial
mixing. Indeed, the 1964 Civil Rights Act explicitly defined "desegregation" as "the assignment of students to public schools ... without
regard to their race," and added, with a seeming excess of caution,
that it "shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in
order to overcome racial imbalance." 18 But surely the Supreme Court,
riding the crest of a wave of general acclaim for its many contributions
to progress, would not fail to respond to a request for a new "advance"
in the very area of law on which its enhanced prestige and status were
based.
There are some things, however, that even the Supreme Court cannot do, and one was suddenly to announce - Brown having finally
been accepted - that the Constitution not only permits racial discrimination by government, after all, but sometimes even requires it. The
Court determined not to permit this difficulty to deter it from imposing the requirement nonetheless; it would simply be necessary to deny
doing, or claim to be doing the opposite of, what it would do in fact.
The basic decision to move from prohibiting segregation to requiring
integration, while claiming still to be only enforcing Brown, was made,
at least tentatively, not in Swann but in the much less n<:>ticed Green v.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1982). See also § 2000c-6(a).
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County School Board 19 and two companion cases decided in 1968,20
with Justice Brennan writing the opinions for a unanimous court.
New Kent County had only two schools, Watkins in the west, formerly for blacks, and New Kent in the east, formerly for whites, and a
residentially integrated population, half black and half white. When
segregation finally had to end in 1965 as a result of the 1964 Act, the
school district adopted a freedom-of-choice method of school selection
that had the predictable effect of minimizing the integration that
would have occurred with geographic assignment. As was to be expected, no whites chose Watkins, and by 1967 only 15 percent of the
blacks chose New Kent. In order to create a test case, the NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund attorneys stipulated that the
school system was being operated free of racial discrimination. The
district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit therefore held that the system was in full compliance with Brown, and dismissed the case. As the court of appeals put it, "Since the plaintiffs
here concede that their annual choice is unrestricted and unencumbered, we find in its existence no denial of any constitutional right not
to be subjected to racial discrimination."2 1
Because it could not dispute the finding of the lower courts that
racial discrimination had been completely eliminated in the operation
of the New Kent County school system, the Supreme Court's only
choice on appeal, it seemed, would be either to affirm the dismissal of
the case or hold that compliance with Brown's prohibition of racial
discrimination was no longer the constitutional requirement. The
Court, however, managed to do neither. With a logic possible only for
an institution not subject to review, the Court through Justice Brennan's opinion both insisted that compliance with Brown - the
achievement of "a racially nondiscriminatory system"22 - remained
the requirement and held that the school district was not in compliance with Brown despite its achievement of a concededly nonracial
system. Brennan denied that the fourteenth amendment was being
read as "requiring 'compulsory integration,' " insisting that the only
requirement was, as in Brown, to "remedy" unconstitutional segregation by "dismantling" the "dual system" and creating a "unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch. " 23 But the fact that the school system was found not to be
"unitary," apparently because Watkins remained all-black, despite the
19. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
20. Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Commrs., 391 U.S.
450 (1968).
21. Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967), vacated sub nom.
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (companion to Green v. County School Bd.,
352 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967)).
22. Green, 391 U.S. at 435 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)).
23. 391 U.S. at 437-38.
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elimination of racial discrimination, seemed to show that the stated
requirement was not the actual requirement and that compulsory integration was indeed being required despite the Court's denial.
The Court's insistence in Green that it was not requiring integration as such but only "desegregation," presumably meaning the ending
and undoing of the segregation by law prohibited in Brown, had many
advantages for the Court. Perhaps most important, it allowed the
Court to escape the practically impossible task of having to reject or
qualify Brown's apparent prohibition of all racial discrimination by
government and permitted the Court to claim, instead, that it was actually enforcing that prohibition. By the same token, the Court was
also able to avoid the difficult task of attempting to justify compulsory
integration in terms either of constitutional principle or of the benefits
it might be expected to produce, something the Court has never attempted to do. The Court's only answer to why it requires racial integration in schools is still to deny that there is any requirement of
integration as such and to insist that the requirement is only "desegregation," that is, merely to "remedy" the segregation held unconstitutional in Brown. This answer is patently false in that the racial
separation being "remedied" is obviously the result of residential patterns, not of prior legally compelled segregation. The answer is in any
event senseless: if compulsory racial integration is sound social policy,
it would seem to be so regardless of the cause of existing racial separation. These defects have not, however, diminished the utility of the
answer for the Court. The justifications that can be offered for a requirement of racial discrimination, disadvantaging people because of
their race, are, after all, quite limited. The claim to be merely "remedying" past racial discrimination is, here as with other uses of "affirmative action," virtually indispensible, whatever its factual and logical
defects. The Court had no need to fear, of course, that these defects
might be pointed out by any of the nation's prominent constitutional
law scholars, of whom Schwartz may be taken as the paradigm, for to
do so would be to leave oneself open to the charge of siding with the
racists. The Court's invariant claim to be merely enforcing Brown and
remedying the violation found in Brown is certainly free from any
word of doubt or criticism in Swann 's Way.
Further, a simple requirement of integration would apply nationally, wherever racial separation or "imbalance" exists and whatever its
cause, while a requirement of desegregation could only be applicable,
it seemed, in the South, where there had been unconstitutional segregation. The unconstitutional dual system would have to be "dismantled," obviously, only where there had been such a system, and the
constitutional violation found in Brown "remedied" only where there
had been such a violation. The result was to divert the attention and
lessen the concern of the rest of the country; the Court, it was widely
believed at the time, had finally "lost its patience" with a devious and
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recalcitrant South that undoubtedly deserved whatever the morally superior Court was planning to do to it. The time of the rest of the
country for compulsory integration would come, but too late for it to
seek the help of the South, and even then it would come only city by
city, because it would be necessary for a judge first to purport to find
unconstitutional segregation, not merely the obvious and always present racial separation, in each case. The effect has been that of a divide
and conquer strategy, preventing the opponents of compulsory integration from mobilizing effective nationwide protest at a given time.
Professor Schwartz accepts the myth, as he does all other myths in
this area, that compulsory integration can somehow be justified as a
punishment merited by the South's supposed obstinate refusal to comply with Brown. Thus, according to Schwartz, the Court's "increasingly active role in the school cases . . . may be explained by the
Justices' increasing exasperation at southern refusals to implement
Brown. As their irritation grew ... so did their intervention" (p. 64).
Like all others making this argument, he ignores the facts that the
Court had explicitly authorized delay in the implementation of Brown,
that in any event a requirement of racial discrimination by school authorities to overcome the effects of residential racial separation cannot
possibly be justified as enforcement of Brown's apparent prohibition of
all official racial discrimination - even if by an irritated enforcer that the South was in fact in compliance with Brown as a result of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, and that compulsory integration was later extended to the - presumably less irritating - rest of the country. The
Court's "increasingly active role," after, in effect, hiding from the issue
for ten years, is explained simply by the fact that the 1964 Civil Rights
Act removed the Court's fear that Brown might not be enforceable.
The Court moved from prohibiting segregation to compelling integration because it could now dare to do so, because acclaim whets the
appetite for new triumphs - the work of moral leaders is never done
- and because to doctrinaire ideologues dwelling in a world of words
all things are possible. It is odd that Schwartz should think that the
Court would make so momentous a move simply out of irritation.
A final advantage of calling the requirement "desegregation" instead of "integration" is that it made the requirement appear to comport with the 1964 Act, which also spoke of "desegregation," although
the Act's definition - assignment of students without regard to race
- was, of course, the precise opposite of what the Court required.
Although manipulation of language is an inescapable part of the lawyerly arts, it would be difficult to find another area of law so totally
dependent upon it. It is probably no exaggeration to say that if judges
and lawyers could not use the word "segregation" - seemingly invoking Brown - to refer to all racial separation, however caused, and
"desegregation" to refer to compulsory integration, the law could not
have moved from Brown to Green.
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The meaning of Green, however, was, to say the least, unclear. On
the facts of the case, it was possible to interpret the decision as being
what the Court said it was (and of course the Court should always be
believed if possible): no more than an application of Brown's prohibitlon of racial discrimination. All the Court actually held was that freedom-of-choice in school selection - unusual, complex, and subject to
racially discriminatory administration - could not be used by a
school system immediately upon ending segregation when simple
neighborhood assignment would produce a much higher degree of integration. Further, if a simple requirement of integration is to be distinguished, as the Court insists, from a requirement of desegregation,
the distinction, presumably, is that the former would apply to all racial
separation, however caused, and would require as much racial mixing
as is achievable, while the latter applies only to the segregation held
unconstitutional in Brown - racial separation caused by official racial
discrimination - and would require only that degree of racial mixing
that would exist if there had not been such segregation. Because the
just-ended segregation would clearly continue to have an impact in
New Kent County - for example, Watkins would retain for some
time its former identification as the school for blacks - freedom-ofchoice in school selection would not make the system as integrated as
it would have been except for past segregation. Disallowing freedomof-choice in favor of neighborhood assignment could therefore be justified as an actual requirement of desegregation, as necessary to undo
separation resulting from past racial assignment.
Professor Schwartz, however, has no difficulty in interpreting
Green as simply requiring integration because he fails to understand
the importance to the Court of seeming to maintain the distinction
between such a requirement and a requirement of desegregation that
can be justified as enforcement of Brown's prohibition of official racial
discrimination. Although he purports to recognize early in the book
that the distinction "is of crucial importance" (p. 51 ), he makes clear
throughout that he agrees with the statement he attributes to Brennan
that the distinction is merely "semantic" and that the "duty of school
boards [is] to maximize integration where feasible" (p. 60). For example, he refers at several points to the "Parker interpretation" of Brown
as holding that the Constitution "does not require integration" but
"merely forbids discrimination." 24 Under this "interpretation," he
says, there would be "no duty to end existing dual school systems,
provided only that they were no longer compelled by state law" (p.
51 ), and he criticizes Burger for adopting this interpretation and applauds Brennan for supposedly rejecting it. He apparently fails to understand that a "dual system" not "compelled by state law" would not
24. E.g., pp. 51, 58, 60. The reference is to Circuit Judge John Parker's opinion in Briggs v.
Elliot, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
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be a dual system at all - certainly not the dual system condemned by
Brown - but merely a system with racial separation or imbalance, and
that it is still the law, at least in theory, that such a system is constitutionally unobjectionable. Neither the Court nor even Brennan (publicly) has ever expressed disagreement with the "Parker
interpretation" of Brown. The Court has, instead, explicitly and repeatedly stated that racial separation not compelled by state law is not
unconstitutional and that the Constitution does not require integration. 25 The Court's supposed requirement of "desegregation" is not,
as Schwartz thinks, simply another way of saying that the requirement
is integration. It is, on the contrary, the Court's way of avoiding saying the requirement is integration because such a requirement obviously cannot be justified as simply the requirement of Brown.
Schwartz' statement that Green "changed the constitutional rule
from the Brown prohibition against compelled segregation to an affirmative duty immediately to dismantle all dual school systems" (p.
65) is similarly confused and confusing. If "dual school systems"
means, as one would expect, systems segregated by law, they were, of
course, prohibited by Brown, not Green, and if it means systems with
racial separation not required by law or otherwise resulting from official discrimination, they are not prohibited at all. If, as is apparently
the case, Schwartz believes that all school racial separation, however
caused, should be prohibited, he should state and defend that position,
not simply beg the question by labeling all racially imbalanced school
systems as "dual school systems."
As a final example of Schwartz' confusion, he states on the one
hand, quoting Green, that the constitutional requirement is "a unitary
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch" (p. 65), without noting that the school system in Green was
found not to be unitary despite the undisputed fact that all racial discrimination had been eliminated. On the other hand, he states that
Green created an "affirmative duty to provide a fully integrated school
system" (p. 65), without noting that such a requirement would mandate the practice, not the elimination, of racial discrimination and
without seeing any need to deal with the fact that the Court has denied
imposing such a requirement. A sociologist or political scientist may
perhaps be properly interested only in what the Court does, not what
it says, but one would expect the validity and consistency of the
Court's reasoning to be of at least some interest to a teacher of constitutional law. Professor Schwartz to the contrary notwithstanding, it
was far from clear that the Court in Green had imposed a "duty to
provide a fully integrated school system," even if one ignores that the
Court denied doing so and looks only at what the Court actually did.
25. E.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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Such a duty was clearly imposed, however, by what the Court did in

Swann, even though the Court continued to insist, now totally incredibly, that the requirement remained only the achievement of the nonracial system required by Brown.
JUDGE MCMILLAN: WHAT A DIFFERENCE A JUDGE MAKES

The misfortunes of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District began with its creation in 1961 by a merger of the school district of the
City of Charlotte, North Carolina, and the district that comprised the
remainder of Mecklenburg County. 26 This merger, which had nothing
to do with race, produced one of the largest school districts in the
country, 550 square miles in area. Although perfectly innocent at the
time, the merger was to prove fateful a few years later because it permitted a federal district judge to "desegregate" Charlotte's predominantly black schools with whites who lived outside of Charlotte and
would, therefore, have otherwise been unavailable for this purpose.
Without the merger the "desegregation" of Charlotte's schools would
have had to be confined to those schools, and it might never have
taken place since the judge would have been unable to achieve his objective of placing blacks in schools with a high percentage of whites.
Because the "desegregation" requirement is merely a ruse used by
courts to require whatever integration seems to be available, sheer
happenstance has played a much larger role than reason in its development and implementation.
In the 1968-1969 school year, the rapidly growing CharlotteMecklenburg School District had 107 schools and over 84,000 students, 71 percent of whom were white and 29 percent black. 27 The
black student population, which had increased from 7500 in 1954 to
24,000 in 1968, was heavily concentrated in the city and mostly (95
percent) in a single section of the city. 28 In 1962 the newly created
giant school district voluntarily adopted a plan of nonracial geographic assignment, to be implemented along with a five-year multimillion dollar school construction program, which was put into effect
for all schools by 1966.29 In short, the school district was at that time
not significantly different in regard to race from the school districts of
most cities throughout the United States: students were assigned to
schools nonracially by neighborhood and as a result many schools
were, like their surrounding neighborhoods, all or nearly all of one
race.
The operation of the school system was challenged in 1965 and,
26.
1969).
27.
28.
29.

Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (W.D.N.C.
Swann, 402 U.S. at 6.
Swann, 300 F. Supp. at 1360.

Swann v. Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 369 F.2d 29, 30-31 (4th Cir. 1966).
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after extensive litigation, held to be in full compliance with all constitutional and statutory requirements by the federal district court. This
ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
sitting en bane in 1966.30 The experience of school districts in the
South since Brown, however, has been that they are no sooner brought
into compliance with the Supreme Court's latest constitutional requirements when the requirements are again changed, as if to ensure
that "desegregation" litigation never comes to an end and that school
districts would never be free of the helpful ministrations of federal district judges. 31 This pattern held true in the case of the CharlotteMecklenburg School District. The court of appeals' holding that the
Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system was in compliance with the
Constitution did not protect it, despite ordinary principles of res judicata, from being attacked again as unconstitutional three years later.
Nor did it prevent a different and newly appointed district judge from
holding that the school system was indeed operating unconstitutionally after all.
The school district was much less fortunate in the second round of
litigation than in the first in the all-important matter of the judge
before whom its case happened to come. Because constitutional law,
and most particularly the law of race and the schools, has little to do
with either the Constitution or law and everything to do with who
happens to make the decision, the contrast between the two district
judges involved in the Swann case is worth noting. The late Judge J.
Braxton Craven, who heard the case in 1965 and found the school
district in full compliance with the Constitution, was a highly experienced and exceptionally able judge and a recognized legal scholar.
Judge Craven was cognizant of his own and the law's limitations, and
his reputation and prominence did not depend on spectacular decisionmaking. He believed that even school litigation should come to an
end and, the purpose of Brown having been achieved as a result of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, he was glad to see the operation of school districts returned to school authorities. 32
30. Swann v. Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 243 F. Supp. 667 (W.D.N.C. 1965), ajfd., 369 F.2d
29 (4th Cir. 1966).
31. See Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804, 805-08 (N.D. Ga.), vacated, 451 F.2d 583 (5th
Cir. 1971) (referring to the "annual agony of Atlanta").
32. His view of the limited usefulness of litigation and of the role of a judge in remaking
school systems is well illustrated by the opening paragraph of his 1965 Swann opinion:
This is another school case. Our adversary system of justice is not well-adapted for the
disposition of such controversies. It is to be hoped that with the implementation of the 1964
Civil Rights Act the incidence of such cases will diminish. Administrators, especially if they
have some competence and experience in school administrationLJ can more likely work out
with School Superintendents the problems of pupil and teacher assignment in the best interests of all concerned better than can any District Judge operating within the adversary system. The question before this court, even within its equitable jurisdiction, is not what is best
for all concerned but simply what are plaintiffs entitled to have as a matter of constitutional
law. What can be done in a school district is different from what must be done.
Swann, 243 F. Supp. at 668 (emphasis in original).
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The contrast in judicial temperament between Judge Craven and
his successor who took office as district judge when Judge Craven was
promoted to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals could hardly be
more pronounced. Judge James B. McMillan was without significant
judicial experience when he first heard the Swann case (p. 13). He
was, Woodward and Armstrong report in The Brethren, "a member of
the United World Federalists, a group of idealists working for world
government." 33 He was apparently no less of an idealist with regard
to what can be achieved by law and the possible contribution of judges
to social betterment. Worse, he had the self-assurance of a successful
middle-aged lawyer as to his competence in all fields, unburdened by
knowledge of the difficulties; he felt, for example, entitled to his own
"philosophy of education" and to instruct school authorities on its advantages. 34 He apparently believed that there must be a simple solution to even the most intractable of problems and that he was capable
of finding it. To those who disagreed, his answer was always the same,
that his solutions also happened to be the commands of the Constitution. The "complexities of this school system" could present no obstacle to his orders, he said, because "the Board and the community must
still observe the Constitution."35 That black leaders considered the
closing of majority black schools "an affront to the dignity and pride
of the black citizens" could not, of course, be permitted to "control
over the Constitution." 36 Asked why school closings were necessary
"[i]f the whites don't want it and the blacks don't want it," he replied,
"The answer is, the Constitution of the United States." 37 Which
would be worse, one must wonder, if he said these things about the
Constitution without believing them or - as was almost surely the
case, his capacity for belief apparently rivaling that of Alice's Red
Queen - he actually did believe them?
One of the striking peculiarities of Swann, not noted by Professor
Schwartz, is that although the school district lost its case in each court
it came before, it lost each time on a different legal theory. It lost
before District Judge McMillan because he believed that compulsory
school racial integration was necessary to improve black academic
performance, 38 a theory not mentioned in either the court of appeals
or the Supreme Court. It lost in the court of appeals on the ground
that although the racial separation in the school system was obviously
the result of residential racial concentration, that concentration, the
33.
34.
35.
1969).
36.
1969).
37.
38.

B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 101.
L. GRAGLIA, supra note 5, at 107.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1299, 1305 (W.D.N.C.
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1296 (W.D.N.C.
306 F. Supp. 1291, 1293.
306 F. Supp. 1291, 1297.
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court believed with very little basis, was itself the result of official racial discrimination - and that, the court concluded with no basis at
all, made elimination of the school racial separation a constitutional
requirement. 39 Finally, the school district lost in the Supreme Court
on the ostensible ground that, like the school district in Green, it had
not yet achieved the unitary system free of all racial discrimination
that was required by Brown. 40
Although the fact that blacks as a group generally score much
lower than whites on standard achievement tests is one of the best
known and most studied problems in the field of education, it "was not
fully known to [Judge McMillan] before he studied the evidence" in
Swann, and he therefore naturally assumed that it was "obviously not
known to school patrons generally."41 Unfortunately for CharlotteMecklenburg, McMillan no sooner learned of the problem than he
also learned, he thought, of the solution. The gap cannot "be explained solely in terms of cultural, racial or family background," he
felt qualified to determine, because, he found, substituting emphasis
for evidence, "segregation itself is the greatest barrier to quality education"42 - meaning by "segregation," of course, simply racial imbalance or, more specifically, predominantly black schools. He had been
informed by plaintiffs' "experts," three professors from Rhode Island
College, that "a racial mix in which black students heavily
predominate tends to retard the progress of the whole group," 43 that
is, that black schools are inherently inferior. This is bad news indeed,
if true - which fortunately it almost certainly is not - for the majority nonwhite school systems of nearly all of our major cities. The solution to the problem of low scores for blacks was therefore clear: a
"dramatic improvement" in black performance could be "produced"
by simply "transferring underprivileged black children from black
schools into schools with 70 [percent] or more white students."44 And
thanks to the happy accident that the city and county school districts
had merged some years before, the requisite number of white students
was available within the school district. 45
Judge McMillan thereupon appointed one of plaintiffs' experts, Dr.
39. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138, 141-42 (4th Cir. 1970),

ajfd. in part, 402 U.S. l (1971).
40. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. l (1971).
41. Swann, 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1297.
42. 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 (emphasis in original).
43. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 300 F. Supp. 1356, 1369 (W.D.N.C.
1969).
44. Swann, 306 F. Supp. 1291, 1297.
45. The growth of the school system was reversed with McMillan's assumption of control,
and the number of white students declined (from 60,008 in 1969 to 45,223 in 1981) while the
number of black students increased (from about 24,520 to 27,717 in the same period), causing
white enrollment to decline from 71 percent to 62 percent. Court-ordered School Busing: Hearings on S. 528 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judici-
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John Finger, as a court consultant, with· all fees to be paid by the
school district, and instructed him that "all the black and predominantly black schools in the system are illegally segregated" - despite
the fact that many of those schools had never been segregated at all,
having been recently built, or had been segregated white schools that
became black as a result of black population growth - and that "efforts should be made to reach a 71-29 ratio" in all schools. 46 Judge
McMillan rejected a school board plan that would have produced a far
higher degree of integration than could possibly be justified as the undoing of unconstitutional segregation or than existed in any major
school district with a substantial number of blacks. He then ordered
implementation of a plan devised by Finger that would, by means of
satellite zoning and cross-district busing, produce a system with no
school more than thirty-nine percent black or less than nine percent
black (except for one elementary school only three percent black).47
"Jack," Professor Schwartz reports McMillan telling Finger, "this is
political dynamite and will cause a real commotion. But let's go
ahead" (p. 19). Objections to busing he dismissed as following an "absolutely false trail," and concern for the children being bused as "crocodile tears" (p. 19). The definitive answer to all objections - such as
a preference for what he called the "neighborhood school theory" was, of course, that they could not be permitted "to override the Constitution" (p. 19).
Although the doings and sayings of Judge McMillan in Swann
would seem to be relevant to Professor Schwartz' tale of the six drafts
of Chief Justice Burger's opinion primarily because they show how
little similarity there is between what the district court actually did
and what the Supreme Court purported to affirm, Schwartz makes no
mention of this discrepancy. He apparently begins and ends his book
with a discussion of McMillan only to add an element of human interest by providing a little morality play illustrating the triumph of courage and integrity over the forces of darkness. Thus, the book's first
chapter, "The Education of a Southern Judge," which contains a section headed "On the Firing Line," is devoted to McMillan and the
price he paid for his fidelity to the Constitution. Federal judges in the
South, we are told, once "led an unruffled existence" and were figures
of "universal esteem," but "Judge McMillan and his fellow district
judges were placed right on the firing line in the post-Brown struggle
to secure a unitary school system. Whatever their personal views on
segregation," they "were bound by the Supreme Court decisions and
acted, albeit gradually, to order desegregation in southern school disary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 562 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings]. As busing continued, however, the
reduced percentage of whites presumably remained high enough for McMillan's purposes.
46. Swann, 306 F. Supp. 1299, 1312.
47. L. GRAGLIA, supra note 5, at 109-10.
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tricts." This "made many of them outcasts in their own communities," and McMillan himself "became the target of abuse and a virtual
pariah in Charlotte" as a result of his busing orders. "No wonder,"
Schwartz notes, "southern federal judges in school desegregation
cases" have been described as "[l]onely [m]en" (pp. 5-6). But McMillan could not act other than as he did, according to Schwartz, because
hearing the Swann case gave him a "factual education" into "the realities of the school segregation that still existed in Charlotte fifteen years
after the Brown decision had ruled segregation unconstitutional." "As
the evidence in the case accumulated," McMillan "began to realize the
extent to which segregation still existed in the Charlotte school system," and as he put it, "I got in the position that I had to act on
something that was based on fact and law rather than feelings" (p. 13).
Professor Schwartz's depiction of the situation, though thoroughly
conventional, could hardly be more misleading. By the time McMillan became a district judge in 1968, the "struggle" was not to "secure
a unitary system" as required by Brown but to impose on southern
school districts an unadmitted and indefensible requirement of integration that had never been imposed elsewhere. The Brown decision
had indeed "ruled segregation unconstitutional" fifteen years earlier,
but can Professor Schwartz really be unaware that no such "segregation still existed in the Charlotte[-Mecklenburg] school system" (p. 13)
- which had, after all, been declared constitutional only a short time
before - and that for McMillan it was simply predominantly black
schools that were unconstitutional?
Far from acting on the basis of "facts and law rather than feelings," McMillan ignored both the facts and the law and acted, his
many opinions in the case make clear, on the basis of little other than
his feelings. The facts showed, not the unconstitutional segregation he
purported to find, but a large metropolitan school district operating
nonracially in which the residential concentration of blacks, as in all
urban areas, resulted in all- or nearly all-black schools. No law, statutory or decisional, required or supported McMillan's order that every
school in the school district be made majority white; neither the
Supreme Court nor any other court, not even the Fifth Circuit, which
often took the lead in these matters, had ever required anything comparable to what McMillan ordered.48
Far from having to overcome his personal views of segregation because bound by the Supreme Court decisions, McMillan issued his unprecedented orders only because of his enthusiastic acceptance of the
view - almost surely factually mistaken as well as, at least in theory,
constitutionally irrelevant - that the effective education of blacks requires predominantly white schools. That the people of Charlotte
were displeased with McMillan is, therefore, not as surprising as
48. See id. at 102-03.
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Schwartz apparently finds it. Their perception that what was being
done to them was not entirely the responsibility of the Constitution, as
McMillan incessantly iterated, reflects a more accurate understanding
of constitutional law than the understanding demonstrated by Professor Schwartz.
Judge McMillan may have suffered grievously for what he did in
Swann, as Schwartz tells us, but surely his Swann experience can also
be seen as not entirely one-sided. McMillan became and probably still
remains the most important man in Mecklenburg County, even if also
the most hated. Surely there is something exhilarating in holding the
fate of a major city in your hands and seeing your notions of good
social policy, no matter how ill-informed, faithfully carried out - an
experience not possible for government officials subject to the restraint
of the ballot. He became a national media figure, being named, for
example, a New York Times "Man in the News,"49 and a sought-after
expert witness at congressional hearings on the subject of busing. 50 In
1981 he was honored at a testimonial dinner attended by "everybody
who's anybody" in the area (pp. 190-91). His deeds have now been
celebrated in a book by a prominent professor of constitutional law, as
they had been earlier by famous reporters in The Brethren. His name,
permanently associated with one of the nation's most controversial social experiments, compulsory integration by busing, will live in the annals of remarkable judicial achievements long after the name of Judge
Craven, for example, who would have ended the case against Charlotte-Mecklenburg years earlier, is forgotten.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg's luck did not much improve in the Fourth
Circuit. The opinion explaining why the school system was not in
compliance with the Constitution, despite the same court's unanimous
en bane holding to the contrary a few years earlier, was again written
by a newly appointed judge, as would also prove to be the case in the
Supreme Court. With Judge Craven not participating and Chief Judge
Haynsworth, recently rejected by the Senate as a Supreme Court nominee, not taking his usual leadership role, the Fourth Circuit upheld all
that McMillan did - although on a different theory, as noted above
- except that it found "unreasonable" the amount of busing that McMillan required for elementary school students. 51
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER:

A

CHIEF

Is EXPECTED TO LEAD

That the school district would not fare better, or even as well, in
the Supreme Court was clearly indicated when the Court not only
granted plaintiffs' petition for certiorari but at the same time directed
49. B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 112.
50. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 45, at 511.
51. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 431 F.2d 138, 146-47 (4th Cir. 1970).
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that McMillan's order be fully reinstated. s2 The result was to require
the restructuring of the school system in accordance with the Finger
plan and the institution of massive busing even before the briefing and
argument of the case in the Supreme Court. It was not surprising,
therefore, that, as both Swann's Way (p. 105) and The Brethren s3 report, at the Court's first conference on the case following oral argument it appeared that a majority of the Justices favored upholding
McMillan at least in part.
Justice Brennan apparently essentially agreed with McMillan that
predominantly black schools are inherently inferior.s4 Justice Douglas,
as always untroubled by facts or logic, had already circulated a memorandum supporting busing as necessary to remove "the black . . .
[from] his de jure segregated school" (p. 92), simply ignoring the fact
that no such schools were involved in the case. Justice Marshall, former general counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, the real party plaintiff, would have affirmed McMillan on the
basis of strong rhetoric and unsupported factual assertions.ss "[T]he
time has come," he would have declared, "for the era of dual school
systems to be ended" (p. 119), although, of course, it had been ended
some years before. To permit all black schools to continue to exist
would be, in his view, "to deny Negro students in Charlotte the relief
they had been waiting on so long" and leave them with only "a hollow
remedy indeed" (p. 119), although it is apparently perfectly permissible for many such schools to continue to exist in, say, Washington,
D.C., where Marshall performs his public service. He found McMillan's conclusion "'that all the black and predominately [sic] black
schools are illegally segregated' was clearly supported by the record,"
although it was in fact not supported at all (p. 119). He was willing to
attribute to McMillan his own "conclusion" that neighborhood assignment "would not produce an effective dismantling of the dual system"
and then find that this, too, was "supported by the record" (p. 120),
although no question of dismantling a dual system was in fact
involved.
Less predictably, Justices Harlan and Stewart also favored affirmance. Harlan, Schwartz reports, "considered himself his grandfather's
direct heir" (p. 39) on race issues, apparently ignoring the fact that
compulsory integration was inconsistent with the view expressed in his
52. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 399 U.S. 926 (1970).
53. B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 100.
54. He would have held in Green that a "stigma of inferiority ••• attaches to Negro children
in a dual school system,'' ie., a system with all-black schools. P. 60.
55. That this approach to decisionmaking is standard with Marshall is indicated by his very
similar performance in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 781-815 (dissenting opinion), where his
willingness to manufacture from whole cloth the facts necessary to support his position brought
forth a specific response by Justice Stewart in a separate concurring opinion. 418 U.S. at 717,
756 n.2.
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grandfather's famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, that the Constitution was "color-blind." 56 Stewart, both The Brethren 57 and Swann's
Way (p. 123) report, looked up McMillan in Who's Who and discovered that he and McMillan were of the same age, had both attended
Ivy League law schools, and had both served in the Navy during
World War II. Stewart, according to The Brethren, thereupon decided
that "McMillan represented a courageous strain of Southern liberalism" and that he had to "admire his courage."58 According to
Swann's Way, Stewart thereupon "felt immediate empathy with the
district judge and looked for ways to back his action" (p. 123). If
either Stewart or McMillan had been in a different branch of the service or attended different law schools, it seems, the public school children of Charlotte-Mecklenburg might not have had to be bused. Only
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Black, it seemed, had doubts about
what McMillan had done, and the eighty-five year old Black, who had
just two years earlier mindlessly insisted on the mid-year reassignment
of students in thirty-three school districts to increase racial balance, 59
seemed hopelessly confused. 60
Since it was clear that Burger was in fundamental disagreement
with a majority of the Justices, he obviously should have simply stated
that he would dissent from any decision affirming McMillan and left
the writing of the Court's opinion to others. A dissent could have very
effectively pointed out that only the 1961 merger of the city and
county school districts made the case possible, that the school district's operation had been found constitutional in 1965, that McMillan's order was based on the erroneous theory that predominantly
black schools are unconstitutional because inherently inferior, and
that, in any event, busing for near-perfect racial balance in a large
metropolitan school district that had ended segregation years earlier
could not, like the prohibition of freedom-of-choice in Green, possibly
be justified as desegregation required by Brown. The requirement imposed by McMillan, the dissent could have shown, was simply integration, involving not the prohibition but the use of racial assignment,
and it obviously should be identified and defended as such, not obfuscated as the requirement of Brown. Such a dissent, probably joined by
Black and perhaps Blackmun - who had not yet disappointed those
who appointed him by joining the Brennan-Marshall camp - might
have changed the course of decision in Swann; at a minimum it would
have served to alert the nation to the fact that something very different
56. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
57. B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 100.
58. Id. at 101.
59. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969). See pp. 67-87; L. GRAGLIA, supra note 5, at 92-94.
60. See B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 124.
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and much more important was happening than the enforcement of
Brown on a recalcitrant southern school district.
Chief Justice Burger, unfortunately, was not the man to issue such
a dissent. For one thing, President Nixon had recently "issued an extraordinary eight-thousand word policy statement on desegregation"
strongly opposing busing and favoring neighborhood schools, in which
he correctly pointed out that for judges to order busing to overcome
the effects of residential racial concentration was obviously to go far
beyond what was required in Brown. 61 To some of the Justices this
made it all the more necessary that McMillan be affirmed in order to
provide, as Schwartz put it in connection with an earlier case, a "categorical rebuff of the Nixon Administration" (pp. 88-89) and make
clear that a president, especially this president, had no power to influence the Court. To Burger, Nixon's opposition to busing presented
the problem that a dissent - especially one not joined by either of the
two "conservatives," Harlan and Stewart - would leave him open to
the charge, devastating among academics responsible for making a
Chief Justice's reputation, of being "Nixon's Chief Justice."
Further, Burger apparently saw the Swann case as being for him
essentially what Brown was for his predecessor Earl Warren.62 Warren
wrote the Brown opinion at the beginning of his tenure as Chief Justice, it was forever seen as his greatest achievement, and he was particularly acclaimed for the fact that the Court was unanimous. The
Brethren reports that Burger "knew that his ability to hold the Court
together on the sensitive busing issues would be a crucial test of his
leadership. Unanimity in key school desegregation cases was a tradition."63 Burger should have realized, of course, that Brown, a decision
prohibiting the exclusion of children from their neighborhood schools
because of their race, presented an occasion for leadership that Swann,
a decision requiring such exclusion, did not, and that he could not in
any event aspire to Warren's acclaim unless he adopted Warren's view
of the Court as an instrument of social change. 64 But he was foolishly
determined to be the author of the Swann opinion and if possible to
obtain a unanimous Court.
At the Court's first conference on Swann, therefore, Burger purported to be in essential agreement with the majority so that as Chief
Justice and a member of the majority he could assign the writing of
61. Id. at 96.
62. See pp. 88-89, 101; see also B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 95-97.
63. B. WOODWARD & s. ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 97.
64. Warren, Schwartz reports, approached legal issues in terms of "ultimate values," which
made "opposition based on traditional legal-type arguments seemO inappropriate, almost petti·
foggery." Pp. 27-28. Schwartz' approval of this approach is illustrated by his casual reference to
"the Supreme Court's role as primary lawgiver in the American system." P. 95. Burger had
already disappointed Schwartz in an earlier case by showing that he "was no Earl Warren so far
as the Court's role in desegregation cases was concerned." P. 89.
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the opinion to himself. This meant of course that he would be required to write an opinion affirming at least in part - in full, the
majority would insist - an order requiring about as drastic and complete a program of compulsory integration as could be imagined. He
apparently believed, however, that he could minimize the damage by
writing an opinion that would make clear that the requirement was
very limited in theory, even though he was not yet in a position to
limit it in fact - the effect of which would be to leave the requirement
vulnerable to easy abandonment by a later Court. Because the Court
in Green had imposed a requirement of integration in the guise of enforcing Brown, the requirement could be undermined by simply making clear what the actual requirement of Brown was.
JUSTICE BRENNAN: WATCH THE PEA CLOSELY

If virtually all constitutional law may be said to be fraudulent in
that it is not, as represented, derived from the Constitution, the law of
race and the schools since Green is doubly so in that it is, in addition,
the very opposite of what it purports to be; incredible as it may seem,
the Court has been able to impose a requirement of racial discrimination in the assignment of students to schools only by insisting that it is
enforcing a prohibition of all such discrimination. Thus, in Green, as
already noted, the Court purported to require, pursuant to Brown, "a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch" 65 but found the operation of a school system unconstitutional despite the elimination of all racial discrimination, apparently because it was insufficiently racially mixed. Similarly, in
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 66 one year later, the
Court, repeating that school districts must "operate as unitary school
systems within which no person is to be effectively excluded from any
school because of race or color," again held the operation of the defendant school districts unconstitutional, despite the absence of any evidence of such exclusion, because of insufficient racial mixing. 67
Finally, in Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board 68 the Court
reiterated its holding in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education that . . "the obligation of every school district is to terminate dual
school systems at once" but again found a constitutional violation not
because the district practiced racial discrimination, but because it did
65. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1967).
66. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
67. 396 U.S. at 20. Schwartz apparently believes that Alexander was the Court's response to
"Mississippi's resistance to Brown." P. 75. In fact, the school districts involved were not resisting
Brown or even Green but merely claiming that a few additional months would be required - a
claim the lower courts accepted and the Supreme Court did not dispute - in order to abandon
previously approved "desegregation" plans and create and implement new plans. See L. GRAGLIA, supra note 5, at 92-94.
68. 396 U.S. 290 (1970).
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not, and required that students be assigned on the basis of race during
the school year in order to increase integration. 69
The Court's effort to conceal the requirement of integration it had
been imposing since Green by calling it the desegregation required by
Brown necessitated that the actual requirement be kept as confused
and obscure as possible. This is clearly illustrated by the Court's disposition of Northcross v. Board of Education, 10 two months after
Carter, its first school case under Chief Justice Burger. Northcross
presented a preview of Swann: Burger began his efforts to have the
Court clearly define the Brown requirement that it was supposedly enforcing, and Brennan maneuvered to keep it undefined in order to prevent the house of contradictions he had constructed in Green from
crumbling. Very briefly, in May 1969 the district judge in Memphis
ordered the school board to implement by January 1, 1970, a "desegregation plan" based on geographic assignment. As very little integration would have resulted under the plan, apart from the seven-month
delay, it seemed clear that more was required under Green and later
cases. Plaintiffs, therefore, moved for an order requiring a "unitary
system," which they explicitly defined - exactly what Brennan
wanted to avoid - as one in which "every public school in Memphis
... would have ... 55% Negroes and 45% whites," with departures of
5 percent to 10 percent to be "tolerated. " 71 The district judge denied
the motion and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
pointing out that according to Alexander a "unitary system" was simply one in which no student was excluded from any school because of
race, and that already was or soon would be the situation in Memphis
upon implementation of the geographic assignment plan. 72
Professor Schwartz reports that Burger, supported by Harlan,
Stewart, and White, wanted to grant certiorari to the plaintiffs in
Northcross in order to "reach the issue of what was required for a
school system to be unitary" (p. 89). The most interesting and instructive item in Schwartz' book, although he clearly is unaware of its significance, is his description of Brennan's (successful) efforts to prevent
this from happening. Brennan, supported by Black and Douglas,
"urged the conference to avoid reaching the issue." "[A]ny 'realistic'
definition by the Court," he argued, "would appear to be a retreat
from Brown and any other type of definition would, given the views of
most whites, simply be impractical" (pp. 89-90). Brennan, that is, if
Schwartz' report is correct, openly took the position that the Court
should not define the constitutional requirement it was supposedly en69.
70.
71.
(1970).
72.

396 U.S. at 293.
397 U.S. 232 (1970).
Northcross v. Board of Educ., 420 F.2d 546, 548 (6th Cir. 1969), ajfd., 397 U.S. 232
420 F.2d at 548.
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forcing, because to do so would make it impossible for the Court to
require integration in the guise of enforcing Brown, and integration
could be required in no other way.
The problem Brennan faced was that, on the one hand, the only
definition of "unitary system" that was "realistic" for the Court - the
only one it could openly state - was the one it was purporting to use:
a system without racial discrimination. Far from being "a retreat
from Brown," as Brennan argued, this definition stated, of course, the
actual requirement of Brown. That definition was entirely unsatisfactory to Brennan, however, because actually to prohibit all racial discrimination by school authorities would preclude rather than support
the requirement of integration that it was his objective to impose. On
the other hand, the Court could not, like the plaintiffs in Northcross,
openly define a "unitary system" as a highly integrated or racially balanced system or one without predominantly black schools, which is
the definition that was actually being applied, because, "given the
views of most whites," an open and admitted requirement of integration would be opposed and would have to be defended, and that, Brennan knew, could not be done.
Brennan had solved this dilemma in Green by purporting to adopt
the "realistic" definition of "unitary system" as one without racial discrimination, but then simply ignoring that definition and holding that
the school system was not unitary despite the absence of racial discrimination because it was inadequately integrated. This "solution"
obviously required that the meaning of "unitary system" be as obscure
as possible, that the deliberate obfuscation of the requirement begun in
Green be maintained. Brennan therefore acted to have Northcross disposed of without briefing, oral argument, or full opinion (p. 90), so
that the Court could stay as far away as possible from having actually
to state what school systems would have to do to be "unitary." The
school systems would just have to learn from experience - the experience of being repeatedly declared in violation of Brown despite the
elimination of racial discrimination - what they could not be told,
that the actual requirement was not the elimination but the practice of
racial discrimination in order to increase integration.
Brennan, Schwartz reports, industriously undertook on his own to
prepare, over a weekend, a brief per curiam opinion disposing of
Northcross without actually addressing the "unitary school" issue.
Brennan's masterfully confusing draft in effect berated the Sixth Circuit for making all too clear that a "unitary system" under the Alexander definition need not be an integrated one, but without ever actually
stating that the Sixth Circuit's view of the law was incorrect and without reversing the Sixth Circuit's decision in any respect. Brennan apparently somehow persuaded first Stewart and White and then Harlan
to agree to this disposition of the case, and with the concurrence of
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Black and Douglas, his draft became the Court's opinion. 73
Only Chief Justice Burger objected, urging in a separate concurring opinion that the Court "as soon as possible" resolve "the basic
practical problems" involved in the requirement of a "unitary system."74 The opinion was muddled, however, by his statement that the
"suggestion that the Court has not defined a unitary school system is
not supportable," because Alexander had stated "albeit perhaps too
cryptically, that a unitary system was one 'within which no person is
to be effectively excluded from any school because ofrace or color.' " 75
The difficulty, of course, was not that the Alexander definition of a
unitary system was cryptic - it was actually quite clear - but that it
was exactly the opposite of what the Court required in fact, as is clear
from the fact that no issue of excluding any student from any school
because of race was involved in Alexander or in any case beginning
with Green.
Burger's objective to limit compulsory integration and Brennan's
to further it resulted in very different approaches to opinion writing in
"desegregation" cases. One of the many remarkable feats Brennan accomplished in Green was that he managed to write the opinion without once even citing the 1954 Brown decision that was purportedly
being enforced; the actual holding of Brown is best kept out of sight, of
course, if compulsory integration is to be imposed in the name of
Brown. Burger, by contrast, began the first draft of his Swann opinion
by citing Brown in the very first paragraph and stating explicitly that
what Brown prohibited was "a governmental policy to separate pupils
in schools solely· on the basis of race," adding for emphasis, "That was
what Brown v. Board of Education was all about" (p. 208). Burger
then took every opportunity to insist, albeit in direct contradiction of
the result he was required to reach, that the "implementation of Brown
I is all that is presented now" (p. 212). He found it "helpful to restate
the essential holding" of Brown because some people apparently were
incorrectly viewing Brown "as imposing a requirement for racial balance, i.e., integration, rather than a prohibition against segregation,"
despite the fact that "[n]o holding of this Court has ever required assignment of pupils to establish racial balance or quotas" (p. 215).
Green, the obvious source of the apparent misunderstanding, he added
in a footnote, cannot be properly read "as a mandate for integration,"
because even though "fully desegregated schools will, of course, tend
to bring about integration," only the "former is constitutionally required" (p. 215 n.10). The only requirement, therefore, was and remains "the elimination of the discrimination of the dual school
systems" (p. 215).
73. 397 U.S. 232 (1969).
74. 397 U.S. at 237.
75. 397 U.S. at 236-37.
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As already noted, a prime source of the confusion that has enabled
the Court to compel integration in the name of prohibiting segregation
is the use of the word "segregation" to mean any racial separation,
however caused, when the requirement is being applied, but to mean
the segregation by law that was prohibited by Brown when the requirement is being justified. Burger attempted in this first draft of the opinion to make this ploy impossible by making clear that racial separation
is not unconstitutional unless caused by official racial discrimination:
"The heart and core of the cases from Brown I to the present embraces
two basic elements: (a) separation by race in public schools;
(b) enforcement of that separation by governmental action" (p. 215).
Far from requiring integration - the undoing of all racial separation
regardless of its cause - the Court's only objective, Burger said, was
"to see that school authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority
from any school - directly or indirectly - on account of race." 76
Racial imbalance may indicate a possible constitutional violation, but
it is only the assignment of pupils to schools on the "basis of racial
origin to perpetuate segregation" that is unconstitutional (p. 218).
The Constitution does not compel a school board "to construct a system with racial balance," and it is certainly "not the function of a
court" to require a school board to do so (p. 218).
Burger would have also made clear that a true requirement of desegregation differs from a simple requirement of integration not only
in that it applies only to unconstitutional segregation, not to all racial
separation, but also in that it requires only the undoing of that segregation, not the production of as much actual racial mixing as may be
achievable. "The objective," he said "should be to achieve as nearly as
possible that distribution of students and those patterns of assignments
that would have normally existed had the school authorities not previously practiced discrimination" (p. 220). The objective, that is, was
simply the discontinuance of "separate schools for two racial groups"
and the creation of "a single integrated system functioning on the
same basis as school systems in which no discrimination had ever been
enforced" (p. 216). Finally, Burger sought to make clear in the first
draft that school authorities were not required to overcome "disproportionate racial concentration in some schools" resulting from "residential problems, employment patterns, location of public housing, or
other factors beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities" (p. 216),
and that "the maintenance of schools, all or predominantly all of one
racial composition in a city of mixed population" is not unconstitutional, "so long as the school assignment is not part of state-enforced
school segregation" (p. 219).
All of this was, of course, anathema to Brennan, as Burger should
76. P. 216. Burger pointed out in a footnote that an "indirect" exclusion would occur when,
for example, attendance zones were drawn on a racial basis. P. 216 n.11.
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have realized from the beginning; clarification of the constitutional requirement supposedly being enforced was the opposite of what Brennan wanted. The majority, led by Brennan, wanted to retain the claim
to be enforcing Brown only as a smoke screen while, by affirming
Judge McMillan, imposing precisely the requirement of integration
that Burger had shown could not be justified under Brown. Five additional drafts were necessary before agreement - grudgingly on Brennan's part - could be reached on an opinion only because of the
majority's insistence, which ultimately proved mostly successful, that
Burger's clarifications of the supposed constitutional requirement be
removed or diluted.
The final Swann opinion still begins by stating that Brown was "all
about" the maintenance of "two sets of schools in a single school system ... to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race," 77 but
the majority would not permit an explicit statement that Brown did
not impose a requirement of integration. Nor could the majority permit Burger to make clear that the Brown requirement of desegregation
supposedly being enforced differed from compulsory integration in
that it applied only to unconstitutional segregation, not all racial separation, and was limited to undoing such segregation, that is, to making
the schools only as racially mixed as they would be if there had not
been such segregation. 78 Such clarity would obviously have made
compulsory integration in the name of enforcing Brown impossible.
As Justice Douglas noted at the outset of the struggle, if the courts
were to be concerned in fact as well as name with merely curing racial
discrimination by school authorities, "the orders for integration would
seem to be quite limited" (p. 118).
Chief Justice Burger did manage, however, to retain in the final
opinion a few less specific statements that would, if taken seriously,
limit the integration requirement. For example, he reaffirmed that the
power of federal courts is only "remedial" and therefore to be "exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation" and only to the
extent required by "the nature of the violation"79 - which is to say,
rather abstractly, that the supposed requirement of desegregation is
really quite different from a requirement of integration. Burger was
allowed to retain a statement that the Court's concern in all the cases
beginning with Brown was with the "elimination of racial discrimina77. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1971).
78. Burger was finally able to make such a statement three years later in Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974), where he was a legitimate member of the majority: "But the remedy is
necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the
position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." The result of thus defining
desegregation as applicable only to unconstitutional segregation was, of course, to find that no
further steps to increase racial mixing were required, despite the existence of all-black and allwhite schools in close proximity. Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented.
79. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16.
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tion in public schools," not with "other forms of discrimination" such
as discrimination in housing, the basis on which the court of appeals
affirmed McMillan - but the majority required that he largely negate
this statement by adding that "[w]e do not reach in this case the question" whether "school segregation" not caused by "discriminatory action by the school authorities, is a constitutional violation." 8° Finally,
Burger ended his opinion with a statement that school authorities
would not be "required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial
composition of student bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate
has been accomplished and racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from the system." 81 In other words school boards
will be compelled to achieve racial balance in the name of desegregation only once, after which racial imbalance would be constitutionally
permissible, there being, of course, no requirement of integration. Unfortunately, Burger was unable to state when, if ever, the busing that is
necessary to achieve racial balance could be stopped (short of the system becoming all black), when stopping it would immediately result in
the reappearance of the all- or nearly all-black schools that the busing
was instituted to remove - the principal question facing school systems that are operating under busing orders.
SCHWARTZ' WAY: ALL'S WELL THAT ENDS.WELL

Burger's attempt to define the constitutional requirement supposedly being enforced by the Court in Swann is as objectionable to Professor Schwartz as it was to Brennan. In Schwartz' view "the entire
[first] draft was negative and indecisive in tone" and objectionable
"particularly in its assertion that the Constitution required only elimination of state-enforced segregation, not the fostering of integration"
(p. 117). He is apparently unaware that the elimination of "state-imposed segregation" is precisely what Brennan, the co-hero (with McMillan) of Swann~ Way, said was the constitutional requirement in
Green, and that no opinion of the Court to date has claimed that the
Constitution requires "the fostering of integration" as such. Incredible as it seems, Schwartz apparently has no notion of the Court's need
to claim to be requiring desegregation, enforcing Brown, and not simply to be requiring "the fostering of integration."
Perhaps most offensive to Schwartz, Burger's first draft "was
overly conciliatory toward southern school boards, going so far at one
point as to refer to their 'most valiant efforts' to meet the desegregation requirements" (p. 117). It is of course an established part of the
mythology of this subject that southern school boards were manned by
unworthy people, perhaps even, as he says of other southerners, per80. 402 U.S. at 22-23.
81. 402 U.S. at 32.
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sons of "warped fervor" 82 - the worse they were, the more easily one
can justify what the Supreme Court did to them - and Swann~ Way
does not at any point deviate from established mythology. The fact is,
however, that most southern school boards did the best they could in
very difficult circumstances to comply with ever-escalating "constitutional" requirements that the Court was not authorized to impose and
that they knew would work to the detriment of their school systems. 83
Virtually every statement in the Swann opinion that attempts to
justify McMillan's order as "desegregation," a "remedy" for unconstitutional segregation, or necessary to create a "unitary system" is contradicted by the facts of the case. 84 For example, the Court stated that
"state-enforced segregation by race in public schools" 85 is the constitutional violation requiring remedy, but there was no such segregation in
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system. As the system was in compliance with all constitutional requirements, as had been held just a
short time earlier, no issue of desegregation, remedy, or creating a unitary system was in fact present in the case. The Court tried to indi82. P. 56. That Schwartz is a man of good heart and strong feeling, even if not of good
understanding or good prose, is seen in his denunciation of the whites of Prince Edward County,
Virginia, where the public schools were closed when the time to end segregation finally came, as
rallying "to the ghost of a brutal civil war, which with blurred, myth-befogged memory, they
chose to recall as glorious. In their warped fervor, they saw themselves as the last stalwart hopes
of a noble way of life that had, in fact, become a euphemism for shallow bigotry." For a somewhat different perspective on the events in Prince Edward County, including the NAACP's opposition to private schooling for the black children, see R. WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN:
THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 65-127 (1984).
83. For a more realistic view than Schwartz' of the situation of school boards in the South
during the relevant period, see the statement of two district court judges in Calhoun v. Cook, 332
F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Ga.), vacated, 451 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1971):
This case is now in its thirteenth year before this court, having been filed in 1958. At·
lanta in 1961-62 was one of the first major southern cities officially abandoning the dual
school system. In its court experience, the original desegregation order was one of the few
unappealed and assented to. Periodically as each new specific to Brown v. Topeka was belat·
edly developed by the higher courts, the School Board has been returned to court and given
new directions..•. Each has been accepted and promptly implemented. In the interim, the
system voluntarily accelerated from the early concept of grade-by-grade annual integration
to system-wide integration; it voluntarily and studiously located new schools and rezoned so
as to maximize integration; it voluntarily liberalized its pupil-transfer plan; and in various
ways increased responsibility for its black teaching personnel, principals, and area superintendents. Through court order, it has advanced from the initial requirement of two teachers
of opposite race to each school to a computerized mathematical distribution of its faculty by
race throughout the city; and from historical and traditional attendance zones to a courtsupervised optimum [integration] plan. No one has successfully challenged the good faith of
its elected Board of Education, the appointed Superintendent, ..• or of its administrative
personnel throughout this uncertain decade..•. Each change has produced convulsive implosions within the system and what has now become the annual agony of Atlanta has
caused significant change in the character of the system, both physically and psychologically.
Of paramount significance, however, is the obvious result. Atlanta now stands on the
brink of becoming an all-black city.
332 F. Supp. at 805, 808.
84. See generally L. GRAGLIA, supra note 5, at 104-44.
85. Swann, 402 U.S. at 11.
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cate, as always in these cases, that the "dilatory tactics" and "failure
of local authorities to meet their constitutional obligations" 86 somehow justified what was being done, even though no such tactics or
failure were involved in the case. The Court stated that McMillan's
order sought to "accomplish the transfer of Negro students out of formerly segregated Negro schools and transfer of white students to formerly all-Negro schools," 87 when, in fact, very few such transfers none at the junior high and high school levels - were involved. The
Court stated that McMillan sought to "counteract the continuing effects of past school segregation resulting from discriminatory location
of school sites or distortion of school size in order to achieve or maintain an artificial racial separation," 88 when no attempt was made or
could have been made by McMillan to justify his orders on that basis.
The Court stated that its objective was to "see that school authorities
exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any school, directly or indirectly, on account of race," 89 when the only such exclusion involved in
the case was the exclusion ordered by McMillan. The Court, of
course, made no mention of the actual basis of McMillan's decision,
the need to place blacks in predominantly white schools in order to
improve their academic performance.
Even less defensible, if possible, than the Court's gross misstatement of the facts in Swann and of McMillan's opinion, is its treatment
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The Act, as noted above, defines "desegregation" as the assignment of students to schools "without regard to
their race" and not assignment "in order to overcome racial imbalance."90 It also explicitly denies empowering federal courts "to issue
any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils," 91 which, of course, is exactly what
McMillan had done. Following the suggestion of Justice Douglas, the
Swann opinion disposes of this embarrassment by asserting that the
legislative history of the Act "indicates that Congress was concerned
that the Act might be read" as applying to "the situation of so-called
'de facto segregation,' where racial imbalance exists in the schools but
with no showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action
of school authorities." 92 The Court, unfortunately, neglected to cite
the portion of the legislative history in which it found this indication
of Congress' concern. In fact, the Court's statement is totally without
support in the Act's legislative history. That history makes clear be86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

402 U.S. at 14.
402 U.S. at 27.
402 U.S. at 28.
402 U.S. at 23.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1982), see also notes 16-18 supra and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1982).
Swann, 402 U.S. at 17-18.
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yond possible doubt, as of course does the language of the Act itself,
that the Court's statement is in direct contradiction to Congress' actual purpose. A clearer example of judicial bad faith in dealing with
an act of Congress would be difficult to find. 93 Hamilton's defense of
judicial review, it should be remembered, was based on the explicit
assumption that federal judges could readily be impeached. 94
Because of lack of understanding or lack of interest on the part of
Professor Schwartz, neither the absence of relation between the opinion and the facts in Swann nor the opinion's indefensible treatment of
the 1964 Act is a subject of comment in Swann 's Way. It is apparently
enough for Schwartz that he approves of the result the Court reached.
He believes that McMillan's orders have been beneficial to Charlotte.
In 1973, the people of Charlotte gave up trying to fight McMillan and
elected a school board with, as McMillan put it, a "more positive attitude" and "willing to obey the law of the land" (p. 192). In 1984,
Schwartz reports, a New York Times article stated that
[i]t has been a dozen years since anyone has been elected to the Board of
Education on an antibusing platform, and two of the nine board members are black. For the past four years, the county's students have
scored above average in a national achievement test, and the gap in test
scores between black and white students has been narrowing. [pp. 19293]

In 1983, he adds, as a further achievement attributable to McMillan,
"Charlotte elected its first black mayor" (p. 193). Indeed, he might
also have noted, busing's tendency to drive whites from school systems
and cities makes the election of black political leaders one of its most
frequent and predictable effects. Whatever the merits of compulsory
school racial integration by busing as a matter of social policy, however, the function of a constitutional law scholar, such as Professor
Schwartz, is to provide analysis of the validity and propriety of the
process by which the policy was imposed on the country as a matter of
constitutional law. Swann's Way fails utterly to perform that function.

93. As Senator Sam Ervin stated:
There is not a word in this whole title that indicates any intention of Congress to regulate "de facto segregation" that is based upon residence. Yet, the Supreme Court nullified
this act of Congress by holding that Congress was a bunch of legislative fools and that
Congress had attempted to regulate "de facto segregation" instead of "de jure segregation."
Busing of School Children: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42, 43 (1974).
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).

